Experimental Mail Server Analyzer Online
I’ve modified the test scripts slightly, to allow arbitrary triggering agents (such as a mail server) to report back the quality of their DNS queries. You may very well be surprised what NS’s your mail servers are configured to use. More often than you’d think, people just don’t know.
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Major Projects
Phreebird: Zero Configuration DNSSEC
Interpolique: Easy Cross Language Injection Defense For The Web
DanKam: Augmented Reality for Color Blindness
Security Talks
2014
Yet Another Dan Kaminsky Talk: Hard Drive Operating Systems, Storage XOR Execution, Secure Random By Default, Cryptomnemonics, Ending Use After Free in Browsers, Fast Spoofed DDoS Tracing, NSA Crypto Fallout
Slides
2012
Black Ops: Practical System-Wide Timing Attack Defense, Real World Entropy Generation For Devices, Safe String Interpolation, Image Loads For Censorship Detection, Certificate Extraction w/ Flash Sockets, Stateless TCP Sockets
Slides
2011
Black Ops of TCP/IP 2011: Bitcoin Cloud Deanon/Data Embedding, External Interface UPNP, TCP SEQ# Attacks Revisted, Generic Password to Asymmetric Key Generation, Net Neutrality Validation
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2010
Introducing The Domain Key Infrastructure:
Zero Configuration DNSSEC Serving, End-To-End Client Integration w/ UI Via OpenSSL and Secure Proxies, Federated OpenSSH, DNS over HTTP/X.509, Self-Securing URLs, Secure Scalable Email (Finally!)
Slides
Code (Phreebird Suite)
Black Hat USA Slides
Interpolique:
Where's The Safety in Type Safety?, Preventing Injection Attacks (XSS/SQL) With String Safety, Why Ease Of Use Matters, Automatic Query Parameterization, How LISP Was Right About Dynamic Scope, Dynamic DOM Manipulation For Secure Integration of Untrusted HTML
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Code
Realism in Web Defense:
Why Security Fails, What's Wrong With Session Management On The Web, The Failure Of Referrer Checking, Interpreter Suicide, Towards a Real Session Context, Treelocking, The Beginnings of Interpolique
Slides
2009
Staring Into The Abyss:
Middleware Fingerprinting, Firewall Rule Bypass, Internal Address Disclosure, Same Origin Attacks Against Proxied Hosts, TCP NAT2NAT via Active FTP And TCP Spoofing
Slides Paper
Black Ops Of PKI:
Structural Weaknesses of X.509, Architectural Advantages of DNSSEC, ASN.1 Confusion, Null Terminator Attacks Against Certificates
Slides Video
Financial Cryptography Paper
2008
It's The End Of The Cache As We Know It:
DNS Server+Client Cache Poisoning, Issues with SSL, Breaking “Forgot My Password” Systems, Attacking Autoupdaters and Unhardened Parsers, Rerouting Internal Traffic
Black Hat Slides
BH Fed Slides (Adds Drupal, DNSSEC)
Video Audio
"Illustrated Guide To The Kaminsky Bug"
Sarah on DNS
Ad Injection Gone Wild:
Subdomain NXDOMAIN injection for Universal Cross Site Scripting
Slides
2007
Design Reviewing The Web:
DNS Rebinding, VPN to the Browser, Provider Hostility Detection, Audio CAPTCHA Analysis
Slides Video
2006
Pattern Recognition:
Net Neutrality Violation Detection, Large Scale SSL Scanning, Securing Online Banking, Cryptomnemonics, Context Free Grammar Fuzzing, Security Dotplots
Slides
Weaponizing Noam Chomsky, or Hacking with Pattern Languages:
The Nymic Domain, XML Trees For Automatically Extracted Grammar, Syntax Highlighting for Compression Depth, Live Discovered Grammar Rendering, "CFG9000" Context Free Grammar Fuzzer, Dotplots for Format Identification and Fuzzer Guidance, Tilt Shift Dotplots, Visual Bindiff
Slides Video Code
2005:
Black Ops of TCP/IP 2005.5:
Worldwide DNS Scans, Temporal IDS Evasion, the Sony Rootkit, MD5 Conflation of Web Pages
Slides Video
2004:
MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday:
Applied Attacks Against Simple Collisions Via Malicious Appendage, Executable Confusion, Auditor Bypass, Bit Commitment Shirking, HMAC Implications, Collision Steganography, P2P Attacks Against Kazaa Hash
Slides Paper
Code (Confoo)
Code (Stripwire)
Black Ops of DNS:
Tunneling Audio, Video, and SSH over DNS
Slides Audio
Code (OzymanDNS 0.1)
Code (OzymanDNS 0.1 for Windows)
2003:
Stack Black Ops:
Generic ActiveX, SQL for Large Network Scans, Bandwidth Brokering, SSL for IDS’s
Slides Audio
Code (Paketto Keiretsu 2.00pre5)
2002:
Black Ops of TCP/IP:
High Speed Scanning, Parasitic Traceroute, TCP NAT2NAT
Slides Audio 1 Audio 2
Code (Paketto Keiretsu 1.01)
2001:
Gateway Cryptography:
SSH Dynamic Forwarding, Securing Meet-In-The-Middle, PPTP over SSH
Slides Audio
SSH Cheat Sheet
Dan Kaminsky's Blog 
Dan, you are a secret spy harvesting email addresses for spammers AREN’T YOU! ADMIT IT!
mubix, you are right 🙂
The world is being overrun by Dans’ — LOL!!
Hi,
The entreprise mail server can’t find and deliver the message …
is that the goal of your tool ?
regards,
Thanks for offering a free dns and mail scan!
In my case, it looked as if both were safe enough… 🙂
ollieno
i tryed it twice with some bulk address i’ve got and the result is a none delivered mail and a report showing on this site telling if the DNS server is secure or not.
May he is collecting addresses to send a Pwonie later, who knows.
I think the attempts to send mail are incidental to the test. The act of your mail server trying to find dns answers is the interesting bit. The test doesn’t care what happens to the mail.
to allow arbitrary triggering agents (such as a mail server) to report collector-solar.com back the quality of their DNS queries. You may very well be surprised what NS’s your mail servers are configured to use.